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Who Took the Christ out of
Quakerism? Rufus Jones and
the Person and Work of Christ
Guy Aiken

T

hroughout his adult life, Rufus Jones remained committed both
to liberalism and to Christianity. The polestar that guided him
between the extremes of secularism and fundamentalism was his
conviction that Jesus Christ illuminated all history and anthropology
by consummating the evolution of humankind and uniquely
revealing the divinity and humanity of human nature itself. In Quaker
denominational terms, Jones melded the liberal Hicksite emphasis on
the humanity of Jesus with the conservative Orthodox and Wilburite
emphasis on the divinity of Christ.1
At the 2010 American Academy of Religion conference in Atlanta,
a Quaker minister said in conversation, “It would have been better
if Rufus Jones had not been.” Jones, he thinks, took the Christ out
of Quakerism and left Quakers with nothing but a humanistic “inner
light.” True, Jones did more than any other Friend to create the
liberal, social-justice-oriented Quakerism most Americans associate
with the Society of Friends today (though liberal Quakers constitute a
minority of worldwide Quakerism). Yet, Jones saw himself as working
passionately to steer historic Quakerism between the bulking Scylla
of dogmatic evangelicalism and fundamentalism on one side and the
swirling Charybdis of secular science and psychology on the other.
Jones lived these tensions out in his own life. Born in Maine in
1863 to a family of Orthodox Gurneyites, Jones grew up a moderate
evangelical. By 1893 he had moved permanently to Philadelphia,
where Quakers had for decades been split into (liberal and modernist)
Hicksite, (culturally moderate and theologically conservative)
Orthodox, and (culturally and theologically conservative) Wilburite
factions. In Philadelphia, Jones assumed a professorship at Haverford,
an Orthodox college, and the editorship of the moderate Friends’
Review, which he soon merged with the Holiness Christian Worker to
create the American Friend. Then, in 1897, he traveled to England,
where, under the influence of John Wilhelm Rowntree and other
37
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English Quakers, he embraced a modernist agenda of adapting
Quakerism to modern culture, higher criticism of the Bible, and
the theory of evolution. In 1907, Jones worked tirelessly to prepare
and orchestrate the modernist takeover of the Orthodox Five Years
Meeting.2
Fired with “a new vision of Quakerism”3 after his visit to England,
Jones departed from the prevailing historiography of his time and
envisioned early Friends not as evangelical “missionaries” and “protopastors,” but as capacious mystics.4 More recent historiography has
judged that the Society of Friends most likely began as an eschatological
and evangelical sect with universalist tendencies.5 Jones, however, saw
in early Friends a mystical brotherhood (a premier stylist, Jones was
also a stylist of his time and wrote almost exclusively in masculine
terms) that revived direct experience of God in Puritan England.
Jones’s mystical reinterpretation of Quakerism allowed him to sidestep
doctrinal debates and to adapt Quaker theology and Christology to
the latest developments in science and psychology. He did so in a
literary style that spoke felicitously but plainly to the burgeoning
American middle class, publishing upwards of fifty-seven books.6
One should not question Jones’s ardent, mostly orthodox theism.
At sixteen, Jones suffered his major “crisis” of faith, when his mother
died. “I could not remember a time when I had not loved God
and felt sure of His love,” he remembered later. Now he could not
“square” this tragedy “with my idea of a God of love.” “But little by
little the memories of sixteen years came over this dark event with
their trail of light.” Jones remembered how intimately his mother had
talked with God, how “fully” she had “expected to go on living with
Him after death should come to her.” Soon Jones “settled back on all
the sure evidences that all my life had been in the love of God.” He
realized he had not lost his mother, “that she was nearer to God than
ever.” He emerged from this struggle “no longer a child,” but also
with his belief in God forever secure. “I had passed a crisis.”7 Jones
emphatically and unwaveringly believed in the Christian God.
One may, however, doubt Jones’s Christocentrism. Gary Dorrien
overstates the case: “[Jones] could be quoted either way on the
question whether Quakerism should be Christian.”8 Jones did not
subordinate historical Christianity to his mystical Quakerism. Early in
his publishing career, in 1904, he wrote that “faith” was “an actual
appropriation of the Divine Life” and that it “produces a religion as
first-hand as [mysticism].”9 Five years later he elaborated, “To insist
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on mystical experience as the only path to religion would invoke an
‘election’ no less inscrutable and pitiless than that of the Calvinistic
system—an election settled for each person by the peculiar psychic
structure of his inner self.” He asserts the equal validity of “faith” as
a pathway to God—“the soul’s moral or appreciative apprehension
of God as historically revealed, particularly” in “Jesus Christ…whose
experience and character and incarnation of life possibilities seem at
last adequate for all the needs—the heights and the depths—of this
complex life of ours.” Jones explicitly distinguished historical faith from
“present inward experience.”10 He retained Christ as the paradigm of
human being and cleaved to Christianity as the faith that embodied
God’s historical revelation in Christ, as well as in Christians down
through the centuries. One should not ask, therefore, “Did Jones
interpret Quakerism as Christian?” but rather, “Did Jones interpret
Christianity, and so Quakerism, as Christocentric or theocentric?”
And likewise, “If so, how so?”

Christ’s Person
“Another truth which I endeavored to interpret…was the perfect
union of the divine and human nature of Christ.”11 Jones notes “two
well-known tendencies” in Christology at the turn of the twentieth
century: the divinization of Christ at the expense of his humanity
(the conservative tendency) and the humanization of Christ at the
expense of his divinity (the liberal tendency). Jones spots dualism
as “the real trouble”—God and humanity as cleanly separate one
from the other. If Christ be divine, he cannot be human; if Christ
be human, he cannot be divine. “For me that ‘chasm’ was unreal.”12
He states, “God and man are conjunct.”13 No original sin or Fall ever
sundered humanity from God, nor has God ever withdrawn God’s
presence from humanity. In fact, the “social law [of] the spiritual
world” evinces the impossibility of such severance and separation. If
God be a God of love, as the New Testament insists, then love would
necessitate that God be in relationship with God’s beloved, humanity.
Also, if personhood characterizes God, then just as a human being can
only attain personhood by relating to other persons, so God can only
exercise personhood by relating to God’s created other, humanity.14
“We could not be persons in any real sense without partaking of God,
nor could He be really God and not share with us in grace and love
and fellowship. He needs us and in a deeper sense we need Him.”15
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Jones everywhere elides Christ and the rest of humanity. Christ
is historically, not ontologically, unique: “Christ is the highest and
completest (sic) person through whom [love and unselfish goodness]
have broken into manifestation in our world….In Him we see what
God is like and in Him we know at last what it means to be a completely
normal human person.” Any “completely normal human person,” in
other words, is as completely divine and completely human as Christ.
“Speaking…in terms of evolution, I think of Him as the type and
goal of the race—…the spiritual norm and pattern, the Son of Man
who is a revelation of what man at his height and full stature is meant
to be.” Again: “The historic incarnation was no final event. It was
the supreme instance of God and man in a single life—the type of
continuous Divine-human fellowship.”16 Jones capitalizes “He” and
“Him” not because of Christ’s nature, for then Jones would have
to capitalize every “he” and “him.” No; Christ’s life, not his being,
merits Jones’s reverent capitalization. Jones superlatively sets Christ at
both the pinnacle and the center of anthropology and history—“the
highest and completest person through whom [love and unselfish
goodness] have broken into…our world.”17 Jones, therefore, is
anthropologically and historically Christocentric. Both human nature
and human history have Christ and no other at their center.
But neither history nor humanity has any absolute need of Christ.
Jones writes approvingly of the spiritual reformers of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, that for them “heaven and hell” abide not as
“eschatological” realities but as “inward conditions.”18 Jones betrays
no millennial tendencies, whatsoever. No bodily Second Coming
will bring the end of history, when Christ will catch the righteous up
into heaven and consign the rest to perdition, or establish everlasting
peace on earth. Such an eschatology presupposes a supernaturalism
that Jones rejects. “The two, sundered-realm conception is a mistake.
There is no divine realm above the sky; it is just space.” Jones holds
instead to an “organic conception of the Life of God,” “revealed in…
the historical process.”19
Jones’s rejection of supernaturalism also shapes his soteriology, his
conception of Christ’s salvific work. Jones confronted the evangelical
Christianity of his day that held to “a definite ‘plan or scheme of
salvation’ expressed in [such] doctrinal form” as sacrificial and
substitutionary theories of atonement, “the acceptance of which was
essential to ‘salvation,’” or “the attainment of heaven after death.”
Jones found this transactional view of salvation antithetical to his view

QRT 116-117.indd 40

12/16/11 12:51 PM

who took the christ out of quakerism?

• 41

of salvation as “a process of life.” “To be ‘saved’ ought to mean to
be living a certain kind of life here and now, not to be able to report
crossing a boundary on a certain day in the calendar.”20
Jones himself, as befit his moderate evangelical upbringing, could
point to a day in the calendar on which he crossed a boundary. He
recounts how when he was a boy, a traveling Quaker minister held
meeting in the old schoolhouse in South China, Maine. After several
nights of hymn-singing and other “fun,” it “grew more serious, for
I saw that I was approaching an unescapable (sic) decision.” He had
led his group of friends in “a hundred boyish pranks,” but now this
minister had convicted him of his sin and compelled him to decide for
or against Christ, and thus for or against “a thousand threads which
wove my life into the past and bound me up with this society of my
fellows.” Finally, the young Rufus reached “a bursting point, and I
arose with every artery in me throbbing and my heart pounding so
hard that I thought everybody must hear it. With a tremendous effort
I made my tongue say, ‘I want to be a Christian.’” Though the boy
knew he “had crossed a line,” no rapture swept over him and settled
his character forever. Even at this moment, “when I knew I had
really passed a crisis in the incubation of a new life, I still found that
the old self was far from dead.”21 The boy’s salvation, as the man’s,
waited every day on his concrete and often mundane decisions to turn
from the “narrow, private ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘mine’ to the Unchangeable
Good.”22
He—anyone—can so decide, not because one’s acceptance of
Christ’s death and resurrection has imparted purely supernatural
grace to a merely human being, but because one’s humanity by its
very God-given nature has from its inception as one of its constitutive
elements a divine-human “light” that does not at all depend on, or
derive from, Christ. This light does, however, depend on, and derive
from, God. Jones directly contrasts theistic humanism to Barclay and
early Friends’ Calvinistic conception of the Inner Light as “something
foreign” to human beings. Epistemology, Jones maintains, has shown
that awareness of infinity is native to humanity: the innate capacity
of human consciousness to become aware of the finite necessitates
correlative awareness of infinity. And modern psychology, per William
James, has discovered a porous center of consciousness surrounded
by an unconscious region that might well house “some real shekinah
where we may meet with [God].”23 This innate reason, capacity for
infinity, or inner shekinah, Jones equates with the Inner Light, which
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he defines as an “actual inner self formed by the union of a divine and
a human element in a single, undivided life.”24
Jones was not a secular humanist. He was a theistic humanist
who believed deeply (albeit sometimes tacitly) in the conjunction of
God and humanity, this conjunction being the Inner Light. Jones
first learned of the concept of the conjunct self from his Haverford
professor Pliny Chase. Jones: “The core and nucleus of man’s inner
life forms, so [Chase] believed, a living junction with the Eternal
Reality of the universe, and through this point of connection the life
of man can be kindled and set burning with a light of truth and a
warmth of love that reveal God.”25 Jones never surrendered either the
human or the divine element of this idea of the conjunct self that he
inherited from Chase.
From the first, I always thought of man as finite-infinite, a time
and space transcending being. He was, I held, himself plus more.
He could not be a person in any true sense without his essential
environment, and that complete environment includes the
infinite and eternal Spirit in Whom we live and move and are.26
For Jones, Christ exemplifies the glorious life any human being in
human history could live if she or he fully embodied, as Christ does,
“the insight that grace or self-giving is the divine way of life.”27 Jones
subscribed to the Johannine Christ’s understanding of his mission,
“I come that they might have life, and that they might have it more
abundantly” (John 10:10 KJV). Christ, however, does not give one
abundant life; he merely shows one how to get it for oneself.

Christ’s Work
The historical conception of Christ’s work that most nearly coincides
with Jones’s is the “moral influence theory of atonement.” This theory
holds that Christ’s death saves not by transaction, ransom, satisfaction,
or substitution, but by compelling (not coercing) those who learn of
his death to emulate his obedience, love, and willing self-sacrifice. As
Jones puts it, Christ is the “Type toward which personal life should
move,” the ideal “in front” that is “drawing” humanity toward it.28
Or: Christ’s acceptance of his fate, in Gethsemane, confirms “selfsacrifice as the principle of human redemption.”29 Or: Christ is the
“pioneer in the discovery of God as Father and in the insight that grace
or self-giving is the divine way of life.”30
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This theory, like every other atonement theory, has ancient roots
in the New Testament but only comes to doctrinal fruition in the
minds of early church fathers and medieval scholastics. Athanasius in
his tract De incarnatione (ca. 318) writes, “For this reason was he
born, appeared as man, and died and rose again…that, whithersoever
men have been lured away, he may recall them from thence, and reveal
to them his own true Father.”31 Peter Abelard in the twelfth century
gives classic formulation to this theory:
Our redemption through the suffering of Christ is that deeper
love within us which not only frees us from slavery to sin but
also secures for us the true liberty of the children of God, in
order that we might do all things out of love rather than out of
fear—love for him who has shown us such grace that no greater
can be found.32
Though this theory departs definitively from supernaturalism and the
ontological necessity of Christ’s death, it retains the absolute necessity
of Christ’s moral example. Without Christ, human beings would
not know God as Father. Nor would they act willingly out of love
instead of reluctantly out of fear; they therefore would never know
redemption.
Does Jones retain the absolute necessity of Christ’s moral
example? No, he does not. For the divine-human light, or reason,
or capacity for infinity intrinsic to human nature, proves sufficient
for turning persons away from “sin” and toward the “Unchangeable
Good.” Here Jones the modernist philosopher wins out over Jones
the traditional Christian. Giving the West Lectures at Stanford in
1941, Jones can define the Inner Light as “spirit” or “mind” without
reference even to God, let alone Christ. “By spirit I mean a conscious
self, an experiencing subject, with organizing dominion over its
objects of experience, together with a persistent self-identity and a
purpose of its own.” Moreover, “the spiritual…does not come down
from above…as a purely heavenly ‘emergent.’ It comes rather as a
new and subtle elevation, a sublimation, of what was here before. The
spiritual…‘breaks through’ the natural as its organ of expression.”
Jones’s radical immanentalism borders on, without ever merging
with, purely secular humanism. Jones derives his conception of spirit
from Kant’s “transcendental unity of consciousness,” “native to us as
men,” which means that “unity of consciousness…is presupposed in
all our experience,” “is constitutive of knowledge, and cannot be a
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product of it. It is what gives our type of experience its universal and
necessary character.”33
One may infer from Jones’s other writings that he believes that
God ultimately has created this “unity of consciousness.” But Jones’s
ability and willingness to drop God from the explicit discussion
understandably resulted in his contemporary and future critics
branding him a “mere” humanist. Jones could explain not only the
epistemological self without reference to God or Christ, but also the
moral self, or “the deep self,” as he calls it in his West Lectures. “The
most august thing in the world is the moral imperative of ought in
us, the consciousness in a crisis…that ‘I must do this,’” he writes.
“You do not become Adam—the man—until something of that order
of must appears.” This sine qua non of humanity, this “oughtness,”
depends on “experienced time,” the ability to “recover a past…, bring
it up into our present, and out of it forecast a new future”—an ability
“utterly unique” to persons of the “spirit type,” or “full-fledged”
human beings. Though Jones does not explicitly connect “experienced
time” to the Inner Light, the preceding quotations suggest that for
Jones this “extraordinary” and “unique” “time-experience” further
grounds the reality of a “beyond within.”34
This human experience of time hinges not only on memory of the
past, but also on “ideals” or “values” that furnish “ideal forecasts”
with which human beings can create a “new future.” About fifteen
years before giving his lectures at Stanford, Jones wrote, “We create
our own ideals and we are the makers of the ends toward which we
live.” Later in the same book he identifies the ultimate values as
“happiness, beauty, love, goodness, truth, God.”35 Now, Jones knew
God as a real referent of experience, so he certainly could not have
meant that humanity “creates” or is “the maker” of God. Yet, about
a decade later: “A person that can create these values and live in and
through and by them is something more than a collocation of atoms in
a space-time frame.”36 Surely Jones meant only that men and women
arrange their own peculiar constellations of ideals and hierarchies of
ends toward which they live, no?
Returning to the West Lectures, Jones gives a similar list of
“ideal values”—“Beauty, Truth, Goodness, and Love”—without any
reference to God per se, though he does call these values “eternal,”
“unmoved movers,” invoking Aristotle’s definition of God as first
cause.37 Jones incorporates “experienced time” with these “ideal

QRT 116-117.indd 44

12/16/11 12:51 PM

who took the christ out of quakerism?

• 45

values” to render an “elevated humanistic”38 account of the formation
of the moral self.
This feature of a beyond within us, this capacity of before and
after, this power to see our deed in the light of an ideal forecast,
furnishes us with a fundamental form of distinction between
what was, or is, and what might have been—between a good
and a possible better. Then we slowly roll up and accumulate
through life-experience with others a concrete or dispositional
conscience which becomes, or may become, a perennial nucleus
of inward moral wisdom and guidance. This becomes, or may
become, to us the deep self which we really are, the self we
propose to be, the self which we would even die to preserve.
This deep-lying nuclear moral guardian in us is one of the most
amazing features of a rightly fashioned life, but one must have it
in order to appreciate it.39
In other words, human beings create their own essences, albeit out
of spiritual endowments. “We are in large measure the makers of
ourselves; but…we start with a precious impartation, or birth-gift,
which is big with its potentiality of spirit.”40
As “birth-gift,” this “precious impartation” does not come
from Christ. Nor does the “accumulation” of the “deep self” find
indispensable guidance or inspiration in Christ. No, by their very
humanity human beings have the Inner Light (early Friends called it
the inward light—the light of Christ conveyed inwardly), a sense of
time, and an appreciation of values, which together prove sufficient
to move human beings to realize eternal ideals and thus form of their
own accord their own essential selves. Jones predicates all this human
action on the existence of a loving God and on humanity’s absolute
dependence upon this God. But Jones dispenses entirely with both
the ontological uniqueness of Christ’s person and the saving power
of Christ’s work. Christ thus becomes nothing more, or less, than the
fullest instance of humanity.
Jones, by interpreting Christianity as a religion of self-actualization
of which Christ is only “an exemplar,”41 did remove Christ from the
spiritual center of Quakerism. Jones urged, in effect, that Christians—
and therefore Quakers—ought to focus their religious energies not
on devotion to Christ, but on the development of the self with
Christ as guide and model. In fairness to Jones, one should read this
conception of Christianity as reflecting not so much a low Christology,
or a devaluation of Christ, as a high anthropology, or a revaluation of
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humanity. Every human being has the same capacity as Christ for love,
sacrifice, and direct experience of God. This lattermost capacity lies at
the heart of Jones’s definition of “mysticism,” that “type of religion
which puts the emphasis on immediate awareness of relation with
God, on direct and intimate consciousness of the Divine Presence,”
“in which all the deep-lying powers of the personal life come into
positive exercise and function.”42 Consistent with Jones’s theistic
humanism, the first part of this definition centers on the divine roots
of mysticism, the second part focuses on the human fruits.
Jones (intentionally?) might have misread early Quakerism as a
mystical renewal, rather than an eschatological and evangelical revival,
movement, yet his absolute insistence on every person’s capacity for
direct experience of God affirms the radical spiritual democracy of
historic Quakerism and witnesses to the perduring Quaker testimony
of equality. Though Jones wished to retain the “fear-aspect of
religion,” and though he attested to the “ministry of pain” and the
“significance of the Cross”43 in his own life, he rarely writes of divine
judgment, let alone the excruciating but spiritually necessary inner
apocalypse of Christ’s revelation and eradication of sin that early
Friends called the Lamb’s War. As part of his saving work among
early Friends, Christ reconciled early Quakers to God by mercilessly
exposing and then mercifully destroying the sin that separated them
from God.44 Though Jones would have agreed that sin can indeed
obscure or even distort humanity’s relation to God, he passed right
by Christ’s priestly office of reconciliation and went directly to God.
Moreover, Jones, no orthodox Trinitarian, neither posited a threePersoned Godhead nor identified Christ as the Second Person of that
Godhead. Jones’s disciple, Thomas Kelly, speaking of angels, voices
his and Jones’s conviction that God deals directly with humanity.
I have always felt sure that God Himself could deal directly with
my soul, without sending any intermediaries. In fact, one of my
joys as a Quaker is in the removal of all the earthly apparatus of
mediation between me and God, and I should find small comfort
in discovering that, on the other side of this world the whole
array of intermediaries is duplicated. No matter how benevolent
such beings might be, I long for God, not for them.45
Kelly thoroughly spiritualizes Christ and so can assert that the “Eternal
Christ…is this same God.”46 Jones never so spiritualizes Christ and
hence never equates Christ with God. Therefore, even in working to
reconcile humanity to God, Christ would be as much an intermediary
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as any one of Kelly’s angels. On this view of Christ it follows that
Jones, as a good Quaker, would want communion not with Christ,
but with “God Himself.”
Jones’s decidedly theocentric Christianity might have “opened
the door to a religion of spirit that dispensed with [any] confession”
about Christ.47 And according to one of his most recent critics, Carole
Spencer, his high anthropology
took Christ out of the Light, the soul itself was the Light,
and the soul became divine….Thus Jones created an ‘inner
light mysticism’ in which the soul was its own authority, an
elevated humanism which severed the inward light from Christ.
Consequently, liberal Quakerism developed a humanistic
confidence in the soul as supreme.48
While this judgment might rightly ascertain Jones’s fontal relationship
to twentieth- and twenty-first-century liberal Quakerism, it rests,
unfairly to Jones, solely on his enthusiastic quoting of the Upanishads
at the end of one of his books: “When the sun is set, and the moon
is set, and the fire is gone out, THE SOUL IS THE LIGHT OF
MAN.”49 Jones himself never conceived of the human soul apart
from God, though clearly he proved willing and able to adjust his
philosophical language to humanistic psychologies on occasion. For
Jones, the soul could be the “light of man” only because “God as
Spirit and man as spirit are inherently related and…there is something
in man which is unsundered (sic) from God.”50 Jones at times might
have attenuated this intrinsic bond between God and humanity, but
he never “severed” it.
In fact, one could see Jones’s “pattern-type” theory of atonement
and high anthropology as a liberal revision of “early Quaker holiness,”
which, Spencer argues, “was closer to patristic concepts of deification
than to Protestant Reformation soteriology.”51 Christ’s role in early
Quaker perfection is often obscured by early Friends’ emphasis on the
“light.” The “light,” James Nayler wrote, “which we witness in us, is
sufficient to lead us out of darkness, bring into the fear of God, and
to exercise a pure conscience before God and man in the power of
Christ.” Jones, in an archaic mood, might have written this sentence
himself, the phrase “power of Christ” being suggestively vague. The
early Quakers’ Puritan and Baptist opponents never tired of charging
the Quakers with blasphemously deifying all of fallen humanity by
conflating the “light” in the conscience with the “natural” light of the
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conscience. “Every writer who entered into serious argument with the
Quakers picked up this point.” 52
Though this critique of early Friends anticipates Spencer’s critique
of Jones, the early Quaker riposte differs markedly from Jones’s
philosophy. The early Quakers insisted that they clearly distinguished
the conscience, which was “natural,” from “the light in the conscience,”
which was “spiritual” and thus no part of human nature.53 Natural and
spiritual—human and divine—constituted a sharp dualism for early
Friends. Jones, as shown above, rejected this sharp dualism and elided
the separation, and sometimes even the distinction, between human
and divine. But perhaps where Jones meant elision some of his readers
perceive elimination, and they cry out, not as the Puritans and Baptists
once did (“blasphemy!”), but as Spencer does—“humanism”!
When compared with many liberal Protestants of the first half of
the twentieth century, however, Jones sounds almost mainstream.
For instance, at Berkeley in 1908 University of Chicago theologian
George Burnam Foster exhorted his audience, “We can never be
satisfied with this Jesus religion as a finality. We must pass from faith
in man to faith in a new eternal Messiah—our Messiah, a creation of
the spirit of modern humanity.” And at Union Theological Seminary
in New York in 1910, William Adams Brown described Christ as “the
type to which all mankind is ultimately destined to conform.”54 In this
context, Jones was not revolutionary; he merely shepherded a portion
of Quakerism into the larger fold of liberal American Christianity.
And he did so without ever effacing Quakerism’s distinctiveness from
Protestantism, as well as from Catholicism, as he persistently and
eloquently asserted the capability of every individual to experience not
only conversion but also mystical union with God.

A Brief Normative Appraisal
The preceding has argued that Jones did in fact take the necessity
and ontological uniqueness of Christ out of his mystical vision of
Quakerism, and he replaced Christ with a divine-human Inner
Light. Two normative questions remain, to which this outsider to
Quakerism will assay only tentative answers. First, should Jones have
taken the Christ out of Quakerism? This question needs an article
unto itself. Jones’s reaction against what he saw as Holiness and
Evangelical Quakerism’s untenably miraculous supernaturalism might
have pushed him further into the liberal christological camp than
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he otherwise would have gone. Yet Jones erred not in theologically
decentering Quakerism from Christ—a perhaps necessary and
healing theological move in the dawn of a thoroughly modernist
and religiously pluralist world—but in literarily omitting Christ from
much of his discussion about mysticism and inward religion. In other
words, Jones erred tactically, not strategically. He should always and
explicitly have referred his theistic humanism to its ultimate fulfillment
in Jesus, whatever the context in which he was writing or speaking.
He should have kept Jesus as his literary touchstone even as he
removed Christ from his spiritual center. Such a tactical move would
not have distracted his critics from his tendency to replace Christ with
a purely theistic-humanistic Inner Light. But it might have kept liberal
Quakerism rooted in its Christian heritage and thus more relevant, not
only to the wider Christian community, but also to the increasingly
global religious dialogue.
Second, should Jones have crusaded for such a positive
anthropology? Again, Jones’s reaction against the Philadelphia
Wilburites’ ascetic quietism might have pushed him further into
humanism than he otherwise would have gone. Yet William James’s
psychological typology of “once-born” and “twice-born”55 might
prove more helpful here than historical analysis. Jones was a “onceborn” type, meaning he had an almost unbroken sense of God’s love
for him from the time he was born. He never had or needed the
experiences of alienation from God and subsequent reunion that
characterize the “twice-born” type. His theistic humanism insisted
on the inseparability of God and humanity and on the intrinsic and
indestructible goodness of every human being. For those souls sick
with sin and with a terrible longing for Home, evangelicalism has
good news: Jesus can heal you and restore you to God. But for those
congenitally healthy souls who have never strayed far from Home,
Jones has even better news: you already live and move and have your
being in God, so embrace your life and live into it as fully as possible.
“The fundamental end of life is living…the fullest and most expansive
life for which we are made.”56 This “faith in the infinite worth of
human personality” might not have been the “message of the Gospel”
Jones’s Aunt Peace had in mind when she prophesied that infant
Rufus would grow up to become the Paul of his age, “bearing” the
good news “to distant lands and to peoples across the sea,” but it was,
and still is, very good news indeed.57
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